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THE RIGHT OF A MEMBER OF A FAMILY TO COIPENSATION FOR
SERVICES.
It is an elementary doctrine of the law of contracts that, where
service is rendered and received, a contract of hiring, or an
obilgation to pay compensation, will generally be presumed; 2
Parson's Contr., p. 48, §46.
Where near relatives either by blood or marriage reside together
as one common family, the one furnishing board and lodging,
clothing or other necessaries or comforts of life, and the other in
return rendering services, a presumption arises that neither party
intended to receive or to pay compensation for the board or other
necessaries or comforts furnished on the one hand or services
rendered on the other; Hill v. Hill, 121 Ind., 255.
A recent California decision, In re Rorher's Estate, 117 Pac.
Rpt. 672, in which the claimant stood in the relation of nephew's
wife and lived with her husband in the testator's home without
cost to her or her husband, allowed the claimant a quantum meruit
on an implied contract. But the Court went further and stated
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that "The relationship between a testator and his nephew's wife
who cared for him during his last illness, and the fact that she
and her husband resided in the testator's home, raise no presump-
tion that she took care of him gratuitously." The testimony
showed that for some nineteen months prior to his death the tes-
tator required almost constant care; that the claimant was prompt-
ed to perform the services out of kindness and had no intention
of charging; that the testator had remarked "she would be well
paid," tho' no compensation was ever fixed, nor the manner of
payment mentioned; that a legacy had been made leaving claimant
$I,ooo, which legacy had failed; that the one drafting the will
testified that the testator said he wished to leave claimant a legacy
in reward for her services.
The courts in dealing with the subject have followed one of
two theories: either that the relationship has the effect of ab-
stracting from the case the element of the presumption which is
entertained when strangers are concerned-leaving it a mere ques-
tion of fact, Saunders v. Saunders, 90 Me. 284; or that the rela-
tionship by blood or marriage, either alone or in combination with
membership of the same household, raises an affirmative, inde-
pendent presumption that the services were gratuitous, Hall v.
Finch, 29 Wis. 278. A review of the cases will indicate a pre-
dominance in the favor of the latter as a basis.
The reason for such a presumption lies in the fact that the
household family relationship is presumed to abound in reciprocal
acts of kindness and good will, which tend to the mutual comfort
and convenience of the members of the family and are gratuitous-
ly performed.
What emphasis is laid upon the various degrees of relationship
in connection with this presumption may be seen in such undis-
puted statements as, "While the rule is that where one lives with
and performs services for a near relative the presumption arises
such services were intended to be gratuitous, yet, in such cases the
more distant the relationship the weaker the presumption and it
would not have the force and controlling effect where the parties
are uncle and niece, -that it would have where they are parent and
child"; Quigly v. Harold, 22 II1., App. 269. The presumption, it
will be observed, remains tho' with lessened fdrce.
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The cases indicate that membership in the same household,
when the relation becomes more remote than that of parent and
child, is the ultimate determining element. In Lloore v. Renick,
95 lo. App. 202, "The relation of brother and sister was not
per se sufficient to authorize the presumption that the services
performed were gratuitous, unless they lived together in the
family relation." The family has been defined to be a collection
or collective body of persons (not necessarily related) who live
under one roof and under one head or management; In re Estate
of Bishop, 130 Iowa, 253.
Where no blood nor marital relation exists, merely living as
members of the same household gives rise to the implication that
no compensation was intended; Deppen v. Personette, 93 Ill. App.
513.
Because cases of this character are among the most odious that
the courts have to deal with, a higher degree of certainty and
definiteness in the evidence relied upon to establish an agreement
is demanded; Hinkle v. Sage, 67 Ohio St., 256. The encourage-
ment of claims for such services is to destroy the peace and har-
mony of the family through the strife and controversy resulting.
Some courts require the proof of an express contract; Wall's
Appeal, iii Pa., 46o. This has its basis in the danger of fraud
and perjury by permitting any member of a family to insist upon
a greater share of property in an estate than is given by law or by
will on the ground that it is due for services. Other courts allow
either an express or implied contract to be proven; Heffron v.
Brown, 155 Ill. 322.
"The terms 'express contracts' and 'contracts implied in fact'
are used to indicate, not a distinction in the principles of con-
tract, but a difference in the character of the evidence by which a
simple contract is proved. The source of the obligation in each
case is the intention of the parties"; Keener, Quasi Con tr. 5.
Mluch diversity of expression seems to exist. The result, how-
ever, is that a circumstantial proof of an express contract seems
allowable in the most strict states, as Pennsylvania; Heffron v.
Brown, supra. The difference between the views becomes one of
exceeding minuteness-sifting itself into a divergence as to the
certainty which the evidence must satisfy.
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To establish a contract there must appear to have been a mani-
fest intention at the time claimant undertook services to charge
for them and that the recipient of the services accepted them with
a knowledge of the intention; In re Schmidt's Est., 93 Wis., 120.
The case, Porter v Dunn, 131 N. Y., 314, cited in the second
part of the decision of the case in question does not apply af all to
the presumption therein considered, for the facts do not involve
any relationship, blood, marital, or family-the testator, who had
been nursed by the claimant, being a boarder. The family rela-
tion was not claimed. The case, rather, refers to the allowance
of a quantum meruit.
A review of the cases shows that in most of the states the pre-
sumption arises in all cases where the parties occupy the position
of members of a family; Clarke on Contracts, (2 ed.) p. 17.
It is submitted that the apparent overthrowing of the relation-
3hip and ignoring of a presumption places this decision in opposi-
tion to the weight of authority.
RIGHT OF A CARRIER TO STIPULATE IN GRATUITOUS PASSES AGAINST
ITS OWN NEGLIGENCE.
That a carrier may not lawfully contract against liability for in-
juries to passengers for hire resulting from its own negligence, is
a rule of almost universal application. The courts give two rea-
sons why public policy requires such a rule: First, it frequently
happens that business demands immediate transportation, al-
though it may be at the sacrifice of legal rights, and common car-
riers have their patrons at such a great disadvantage that they can
readily exact from them a stipulation to the effect that the carrier
will not be liable for injuries resulting from the negligence of its
servants. The contract is one-sided. The patrons have no alter-
native offer. Second, the state or government has such an interest
in protecting the lives and limbs of its citizens that it cannot per-
mit the carrier to make any contract tending to diminish the care
taken to protect passengers from injury.
An examination of the decisions on this point shows that some
courts base the rule on the first of these reasons, and others on
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the second. Regardless of the basis for the rule, the conclusiori is
the same, so long as we are concerned only with passengers for
hire. But whether the same rule will be applied to passengers
riding on gratuitous passes will depend upon which of the above
given reasons is accepted as the foundation of the rule. The fol-
lowing cases will show that the courts have differed as to which is
the true basis of the general rule, and in so doing they have
necessarily differed in their answer to this question.
It was recently decided in Shelton v. Railway Co., 189 Fed. i,
that where a man had accepted a pass for which he had given no
consideration, and there was printed on the pass a stipulation that
the carrier would not be liable for any injury to his person, even
by the negligence of its servants, the stipulation was valid, and
the holder of the pass, having been injured by the negligence of
the carrier, was not allowed to recover.
The court disposed of the question by saying that the holding
in Railway Co. v. Adams, 192 U. S., 44o, governed the case. In
the case last cited, Justice Brewer, speaking for the court, said that
the carrier may contract against its negligence in cases of persons
riding on free passes. On this point the court said, "It (the rail-
way company) offered him the privilege of riding in its coaches
without charge if he would assume the risks of negligence. He
was not in the power of the company and obliged to accept its
terms. They were on equal footing. If he had desired to hold
it to its common law obligation to him as a passenger, he could
have paid his fare and compelled the company to receive and
carry him. He freely and voluntarily chose to accept the privi-
lege offered, and having accepted that privilege cannot repudiate
the conditions." In Boering v. Railway Co., 193 U. S., 442, the
court, through the same eminent Justice, reaffirmed its former
holding in these words: "A person who is injured while a passen-
ger of a railroad company by reason of the negligence of the com-
pany's agents cannot recover damages from the company if in-
jured while riding on a free pass, issued by the company as a mere
gratuity and containing a printed condition that the party accept-
ing and using it assumes all risk of accident to person or property,
whether caused by the negligence of the company's agents or oth-
erwise: such condition being valid and binding." The same con-
clusion was reached in the following cases: Rogers v. Steamboat
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Co., 86 Me., 261; Quimby v. Railway Co., 150 MNass., 365; Kinney
v. Railway Co., 32 N. J. L., 407; Muldon v. Railway Co., io
Wash., 311; Wells v. Railway Co., 24 N. Y., 181; Payne v. Rail-
way Co., 157 Ind., 616.
In the last case cited, the court held that not only was no prin-
ciple of public policy subverted by denying the holder of a free
pass the right to repudiate his contract, but that there was sound
public policy in holding him to it. The argument of the court was
that persons who accept free passes voluntarily separate them-
selves from the general public, and in so doing they increase the
burden of the expense of operating the railroads on the patrons
who pay.
A survey of the cases cited above discloses the fact that the
decisions go on the theory that the general rule prohibiting the
limitation of the carrier's liability does not apply to holders of
free passes because such persons are free to accept the terms
offered to reject them, pay the fare and hold the company to its
common law liability. They rest entirely on the first of the two
reasons previously mentioned.
But some jurisdictions hold that the general rule rests not so
much on the inability of the patron to contract on equal footing
with the carrier, but on the theory that "the law raises the duty
out of regard for human life and for the purpose of securing the
utmost vigilance by carriers in protecting those who have com-
mitted themselves to their hands." McNeil v. Railroad, 135 N. C.,
682. That case held the stipulation void and permitted recovery.
Likewise in Jacobus v. Railway Co., 20 Minn., 130, the court held
that so far as the consideration of public policy is concerned, it
cannot be overridden by any stipulation of the parties to the con-
tract of passenger carriage, since it is paramount from its very
nature, and that no stipulation of the parties in disregard of it or
involving its sacrifice in any degree can be permitted to stand.
Therefore, whether "the case be one of a passenger for hire, a
merely gratuitous passenger, or a passenger upon a conditioned
free pass, the interest of the state in the safety of the citizen is
obviously the same." This view is supported by Railway Co. v.
Flood, 35 Tex., Civ. App., 197; Rose v. Railroad, 39 Iowa, 246;
Railway Co. v. Butler, 57 Penn. St., 337; Burnett v. Railway Co.,
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176 Penn. St., 45; Farmers Loan & Tritst Co. v. Railway Co., lO2
Fed., 17; Railroad v. McGowan, 65 Tex., 64o .
Undoubtedly the weight of authority is with the principal case
in holding that a stipulation in a gratuitous pass whereby the
holder of the pass agrees to assume the risks of injury, even when
caused by the carrier's negligence, is valid and binding But it
appears that there is much authority for holding such stipulation
void.
